08/02/2005
FEATURE BY CHRIS BALFE
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When FIA president, Max Mosley, released a whole raft of documents relating to the ongoing cost cutting saga, Pitpass described it as a masterstroke.
Reading through the various documents it appeared that Mr Mosley had a point, and that the media, not for the first time, was working itself into a frenzy for nothing. Some regarded the decision by the nine rebel teams not to attend the 28 January meeting with Mosley as churlish, and laughed when the former barrister claimed that more had been achieved in their absence than had they been present.
The minutes of the meeting, attended by Mosley, Charlie Whiting and Richard Woods of the FIA and Ferrari's Jean Todt and Ross Brawn, make fascinating reading. Although there remained a few areas where the Italian outfit was clearly at odds with its nine rivals, it was clear that there was hope that a satisfactory outcome might be reached, and that Formula One might avoid further acrimony and the ensuing negative publicity.
Though the Italian team was adamant with regards testing restrictions, there was clearly a softening in its attitude towards other issues of contention, in particular the thorny subject of the single tyre.
A masterstroke indeed.
However, Pitpass editor Chris Balfe is too long in the tooth not to realise that there are two sides to every story. Though it was refreshing to see the FIA make these documents - and so any of them - public, there was this question nagging away at him, why? Formula One and its governance is steeped in secrecy, almost to the point of paranoia, so why the sudden openness?
Much was made of a 45-page missive sent by Minardi boss Paul Stoddart to Mosley, who subsequently made the document public, in all its glory. Try as he might, editor Balfe found himself unable to get more than just a few pages into it before his eyes began to glaze over.
Consequently, he sat down with Stoddart, the so-called shop steward - a term he dislikes intensely - for the nine teams at odds with the FIA and Ferrari, and asked the Australian to explain what it is that at a time we should be looking forward to a new season, and hopefully a new beginning, is threatening to tear Formula One apart.
This is not a situation that can be explained away with a few bullet points. It is a complex, highly intriguing tale. According to Stoddart, who let us remember is representing nine Formula One teams, including his own, it would 'appear' that some parties are not being quite as open as they would have us believe, while others are only having a change of heart now that certain objectives have been achieved, and deadlines passed.
What follows is a conversation whereby Stoddart, with the backing of eight other Formula One team principals attempts to give their side of the story. It is worth sticking it out to the very end, even if you do find your eyelids getting heavy.
"Basically, I want to tell you our side of the story," Stoddart begins.
"I started to read the 45-page document this week, but it wasn't long before my eyes began to glaze over," I confess. "I think this is probably why Max had it posted in the first place."
"It's a document which, if you do take the time to read it, however, tells you that the 2005 (Formula One) regulations aren't legal," says Stoddart, "the fax votes aren't legal and, in fact, just about everything Max has done falls into that category since he changed from being a genuine supporter of the concept of trying to push F1 towards saving money. In Monaco last year, he changed, and changed completely.
"In 2002, Max could see what was happening with F1. There was the beginning of the GPWC, Bernie's issue with the banks and everything else. Max feared the time when the manufacturers would pull out and F1 would implode.
"I shared that view with him. Max was one of the supporters of the small, independent teams. He supported me in 2002 and 2003, but by the end of '03, he had clearly had enough of trying to tell the big teams that they had to look at costs, that they had to be prepared to supply engines to the independent teams, that the cost of being competitive in F1 had to be reduced to a point where you didn't need $400m to go racing, that if they didn't, the sport was ultimately going to become unsustainable.
"The independent teams, and even some of the manufacturers, were behind Max in this. They fully agreed.
"In the middle of 2004," he continued, "though, from the Monaco meeting onwards, it seems Max decided that the only way forward was radical change. When he found that the teams weren't going to bite, he decided to make use of Clause 7.5 of the Concorde Agreement - the safety clause.
"Don't forget, there was protection under the Concorde Agreement for the 3-litre V10 engine in terms of what Max could and couldn't change.
"I don't think anyone thought that these measures were really being brought in on safety grounds, as you only need to look at what Max has said. At Monaco, for example, he said the two things fundamental to the future of F1 were the single tyre supplier and the single ECU.
"In response to a question at the Monaco press conference, he said: 'Just to be clear, we cannot change the engine; that is, we cannot change it from a V10 to a V8. That is outside Concorde. We can't do that under safety. It cannot be done until 2008, without unanimous agreement.'
"This is a man who has claimed to be a champion of the small teams, yet now you've got the owner of the smallest team telling you that it's cost us a fortune with all these new regulations. These have put my costs up by 20 per cent, failed to save me anything, and made me around 3 or 4 seconds less competitive than I was, which was already bad enough.
"Let's think about the implications of these so-called 'safety' changes for a second," he continues. "We used to have seven sets of tyres a weekend. Tyre companies don't charge you any more or less for that. The only people to save money under the new rules are the tyre companies, as they don't have to produce so many tyres.
"The bigger teams have seen their testing costs increase enormously - except for Ferrari - because they've had to run 700-km distances on the (two-race) engine, and race distance after race distance to see if these one-event tyres are going to last. It has actually almost doubled the out-of-season testing mileage."
It's clear that Paul is getting angry at the very thought of this apparently contradictory state of affairs. "Sorry mate," he apologises, "but it's just not saving money.
"Max made an effort in Monaco (2004), got all the teams together and said, 'we're going to cut all this expenditure', but when the teams said, 'no, it doesn't work like that, Max,' he then introduced regulations that actually increase the costs.
"As for safety, in my letter to Max, I wrote, 'Max you're a lawyer and I respect you, but how on earth can you say, given the situation last year where you had two tyre manufacturers - both fantastic, ultra-competitive companies - taking it to the edge in an attempt to beat one another, that a single race weekend tyre contributes to a safer racing environment?
"Without wishing to be over-dramatic, I believe we saw a situation where (Jenson) Button could have been killed, or at least very seriously injured last year (Spa), if it hadn't been for the fact that (Zsolt) Baumgartner was alongside him. It was a bad enough accident as it was, but it would have been a monumental accident if the BAR had speared into the Armco or gone into the trees. Tyres fail for whatever reason, and we know of several occasions when that happened last year. Be it caused by debris or otherwise, surely this fact cannot be ignored.
"You've now taken those tyres away and introduced one-race tyres, and what is a likely scenario? Your driver charges down to the first corner, there's an incident, he locks up the brakes and flat-spots his tyres. The car's now vibrating, so what's he going to do - come in for a precautionary change of tyres? Of course not. He knows it's potentially the end of his race if he does, so he'll stay out there, put up with the vibration, and get on the radio saying, 'The car's undriveable. What do I do?' The team will come back, 'You're in the points. Keep going. Don't worry about it'. Well, we will find ourselves worrying about it if a tyre fails in such circumstances and, heaven forbid, goes into the crowd, with the result that someone gets seriously injured - or worse."
I have to ask, in Paul's opinion, what does he think Mosley's agenda is? The man is not a fool, far from it, so why is pursuing his current course?
"I believe it's to do with the GPWC and the manufacturer teams," replies Stoddart. "That's been an issue for quite a while, ever since the manufacturers came up with the GPWC concept and said they didn't necessarily want the FIA as the regulator. You have to go back to December 2004, when Max wrote a stinging letter, saying that the GPWC was 'welcome to organise its own championship at any time it wants to; however, those teams that are owned by the manufacturers are contracted to the Formula One World Championship until 31 December 2007'. He also observed that, 'it is not helpful for the sport for people to be threatening to do things, as this simply destabilises the sport'. I agree with every word of this, I might add.
"That's the key, however; that's when Max went to war with the manufacturers. It was when the GPWC said that it didn't necessarily want the FIA as regulator.
"Max was the champion of Formula One. He wanted to cut costs, protect the independents and see the sport move forward. In the middle of 2004, however, he lost the plot, mainly because he ran out of patience. And you cannot blame him, as he was bashing his head against a wall. I know, because I was there.
"But then, in Monaco, when he invited us all to meet and discuss the future regulations, from that point onwards, his attitude changed completely. In fairness, it must be said that this was the result of the team bosses continuing to fight and squabble. Max brought in a set of rules, through the front door, under the guise of safety, and the teams got to the point where they were running out of time before the Article 7.5 'measures' took affect. We then received the news, in China, that Ford had gone, and that sent shockwaves through us all. Then again, it was also what eventually united us.
"It was the news of Ford pulling out of F1, the fact that we weren't sure there would be a buyer for Jaguar, the fact that Eddie (Jordan) and I didn't know what was happening regarding our Cosworth engine supplies, all of that helped to crystallise the situation.
"We 'lost' the Japanese Grand Prix weekend due to the typhoon, but in Brazil, it was clear we had a different situation.
"What transpired in Brazil was the result of a 'fax vote' that many people thought was not legal or correct. We were all about to leave for Brazil, on Monday, October 18, when a fax with extensive technical and sporting regulations was sent out by the FIA, bearing the words 'subject to the approval of the Formula One Commission'.
"Now my first point about this is that, in itself, there is no mechanism within the Concorde Agreement for 'fax votes', but this fax also had a nasty little sting in the tail. It said, 'if we don't hear from you, we will assume that you confirm and agree with these arrangements'. Now legally, this is flawed, because a 'no' vote is a 'no' vote. If it's an absentee, it is not deemed to be in the affirmative."
At this point, I comment that Paul missed out on his true vocation, and that should he have gone into law, he would certainly have made more money. He laughs, and admits to spending his Christmas break writing the 45-page document to Mosley that has recently come to light.
"The real problem with the October 18 'fax vote' is that it was distributed to the teams the week everyone was travelling to Brazil. On arriving in Sao Paulo, we called a meeting for the Friday, because there was another little line in this fax, saying, 'If you haven't responded by 17:00 (Geneva time) on Friday 22, we'll assume that you agree with what we said.'
"I went with Tony Purnell (Jaguar Racing) and Bernard Ferguson (Cosworth Racing), straight from the airport - having travelled through the night - to the team owners' meeting, to find that we were not the only ones to arrive a few minutes late. There was a mad rush to get everyone together because we had to respond early, in order to meet the (Geneva) deadline that had been imposed.
"We had the meeting, and suddenly it was like a transformation. The Team Principals all started to act as one, with one voice.
"We sat there, and said, 'We've got to sort this out. We've got to sort out tyres, testing, the areas where the real costs are. What are we going to do about these regulations?' We asked each other who had voted and who hadn't. It turned out that some hadn't even voted because they didn't feel Max was doing things legally. We agreed that, immediately after practice, we'd hold another meeting."
At this point, I ask Paul to clarify if Ferrari was present at this first meeting.
"Yes," he replies. "In practice, however, Michael had a heavy shunt, and this is where Ferrari got offside. It turned out we didn't invite (Jean) Todt, but we didn't know that. It was a genuine oversight. When the message was delivered to the Team Principals, Todt was in a meeting with Michael and Ross Brawn, and Bernie's representative was told not to go in. To cut a long story short, however, Todt was not invited. It was a mistake, pure and simple. I've since tried to explain what happened to Todt, who really did not want to know."
In order to clarify this critical point, I ask Paul if the failure to invite Todt was therefore an accident, and nothing else.
"Absolutely," he replies. "Michael had had a shunt. The Team Principals were sitting in the meeting, we waited a few minutes, and then went ahead, thinking Jean would walk in the door at any time, but he didn't. We didn't read anything into it - certainly, there was nothing sinister. However, he (Todt) then refused to come to the next meeting."
"So there were three meetings," I ask.
"Yes," Paul replies. "Todt attended the first one, but didn't want to talk about testing or the single-tyre issue. He didn't attend the second one - we thought innocently, but subsequently discovered he believed it was a 'set up' - and he simply elected not to attend the third meeting.
"As a result of those meetings, we came up with the famous document that everyone has seen. To get Peter Sauber to sign was a major achievement, and I really admire him for doing it, because in essence he was going against Todt, don't forget. He actually issued his own press release, to clarify the Sauber position.
"As the teams were leaving Brazil, I'm sure the media, and even most race fans, thought, 'We've seen all this before. By Christmas, they'll be fighting again.' But that didn't happen. We had two more productive meetings in December, and have had another two since. We are together, and that's a fact. We've gone through three team ownership changes since then, with three new team bosses arriving, but we're still together and holding. Indeed, I would say we're getting stronger.
"The meeting on Tuesday, January 25, was particularly constructive. We're achieving things and we're not going to be swayed. We are genuinely interested in the long-term future of this sport . . . ."
At this point, a rarity, I interrupt. Knowing Paul's 'history' with Ron Dennis, I am amazed that the hatchets appear to have been buried.
"We are working together," says Stoddart, "side by side. In all honesty, yes, there was a degree of animosity between Ron and me, and furthermore, I didn't enjoy a great relationship with Frank (Williams) either, but since Brazil, all of us have been working extremely closely together. For Max and Ferrari to be so 'on their own' . . . are nine teams wrong and one team right? I don't think so.
"As for Ferrari's comment that reducing testing won't save money, that's absolutely right when you're being paid over $30 million a year by Bridgestone to test and you already own two test tracks. Of course, it doesn't cost Ferrari money to go testing, but it bloody well costs everyone else.
"The reason we didn't go to the Friday meeting (January 28) was quite simple. The future of Formula One's technical regulations is at stake, and we're going to turn up at a meeting on a Friday afternoon in London and discuss 50 items in detail? Not possible!
"So what we decided during the January 25 meeting, and explained in a letter to Max, one which he hasn't reproduced, was to spend a couple of days with our technical and engine people, away from everyone and everything - no mobiles, no distractions - and go through these items line by line. The clear objective will be to come up with a set of proposals that have been carefully thought through and will genuinely save money and increase the show, instead of knee-jerk reactions.
"If we'd gone to the FIA meeting, it would have been the same as it was in Monaco. There would have been a pre-set agenda, he'd have gone through it all, you lot (the media) would have received a statement afterwards saying, 'The teams have today agreed on all the following, and by the way, we're going to bring in some of them for 2006 or 2007.' "
Once again, I have to ask Paul to clarify: "So the nine teams are willing to sit down together, for a couple of days, to come up with their own proposals for 2008, and they can have these ready by mid-summer?"
"Yes," he replies. "We know how to cut 30 per cent from our budgets, and you can't do that until you add everything else together. We want a single tyre from January 1, 2006, and to cut the testing to 10 days in-season. That's it."
I ask if he is interested in Jean Todt's idea of simply limiting test mileage rather than days.
"The mileage thing is just another way for Ferrari to get out on track every day. That said, though, even that could be discussed. We won't dismiss it, because we are open to dialogue. What we must have, however, is a single tyre supplier for 2006.
"Let's just go back to Max's agenda. All these proposed new regulations have been introduced by Max, and nobody else, in an attempt to reduce lap times by around three seconds. Now we know that, despite the aero changes for 2005, over the winter at least four teams have clawed back aerodynamic downforce to the same level they had in 2004, and it is only a matter of time before their rivals do likewise. I've also heard that effectively we're taking the same compound tyres to Melbourne that we used in 2004, because the tyre companies have succeeded in clawing back sufficient performance, despite the new regulations, that the tyres remain at last season's levels. In terms of competitive speed, we're not going to see a change in the tyres."
I point out that, thus far in testing, the times posted by the 2005 cars are extremely close to the times in 2004, and this is at the start of the year, before development really kicks in.
"Exactly my point," says Paul. "I'm telling you, the FIA has accomplished absolutely nothing. Look at the engines, for example - the manufacturers, with their $200 million development budgets, have simply succeeded in increasing engine life while retaining performance levels. Consequently, when qualifying times in Melbourne turn out to be the same as they were in 2004, where will Max's three seconds be then? Of course, he'll turn around and say, 'Ah, but if I hadn't acted, the cars would have been three seconds quicker.'
"The facts are simple. Just look at the lap times from 2001, when we first had two tyre manufacturers. You can attribute 70 per cent of the increase in F1 speeds since then to the tyres; it's as simple as that. As far as speeds are concerned, whatever control you want to put in is in the tyres. That's why we must have a single supplier."
I ask the obvious: how will the tyre manufacturers react when F1 essentially says, 'Thanks, but no thanks. We only want one of you now, and the other can go.'?
"However much we hate the current Concorde Agreement, it is all we've got. However much of a rum piece of drafting it is - and it is - it's what we have to live by.
" Under Concorde Section 7.5 (c) (II), it actually says: "For the purpose of 7.5 (c), 'measures' means measures which:
"Under this section, Max had an obligation, assuming we agree that his measures are legal, which they're not . . . .
"Section 7.5 (d), which is where I feel the current 2005 procedures fall apart, states, 'The World Motorsport Council shall consult the F1 Technical Working Group before forming an opinion as to the performance of the cars or introducing any measures under this clause 7.5.' That's the FIA's Achilles' heel in all of this. They didn't do it; the World Motorsport Council did not consult the F1 Technical Working Group before forming an opinion as to the performance of the cars and before introducing measures under 7.5."
Paul emphases the words 'shall' and 'before', making it clear that they do not mean 'may' or 'during' and 'after' respectively. He then reveals that this clause was inserted in the Concorde Agreement to prevent situations like this occurring.
I ask Paul to clarify the situation with Ferrari, ignoring the whole GPWC saga and the other financial issues with Bernie Ecclestone. Is it simply case of 'us and them'?
"Regrettably, it's now becoming that way," he admits, "because we've made it that way. We had the (first) meeting in Brazil with Jean Todt present, and pointed out that we'd lost a manufacturer (Ford) and that Max was messing with the regulations. We posed the questions, 'What are we going to do about it, bearing in mind that previously none of us could agree on anything? Isn't it about time we started to act like a professional board of directors for F1 and take the sport forwards? We all know what's got to be done, so let's put our personal agendas aside and get on with it.'
"We came up with our ideas, and these hinged on the belief that the best way to cut costs is to reduce testing, and the best way to do that is to revert to a single tyre. We all began to agree, and for the big teams that was a massive move.
"This all happened at the first meeting (Brazil), but Jean (Todt) sat there saying, 'I do not agree, I do not agree, testing costs nothing,' at which point, Ron (Dennis) said, 'Of course not. You get paid $35million by Bridgestone to test.' Jean simply replied, 'Testing is not the problem. We carry too much ballast on the cars. The cars are too heavy. We carry all this ballast. I do not agree to tyres.'
"We then said that we'd put something together and make a proposal after practice, but he wasn't at that second meeting. Let me emphasise, however, that this was genuine. He was tied up with Michael (Schumacher), who, as I've already said, had crashed heavily in practice.
"The (second) meeting was attended by Bernie, who in turn, invited Max. On arriving, Max said, 'This is all very good, but we can only agree minor changes because it's all too late now, I'm afraid to say.' He didn't say any more. He was only there for a couple of minutes and answered a couple of questions.
"Once he left, it was clear there was a consensus of nine team principals, plus Bernie, genuinely to look at the problems. Don't forget, at this point we didn't know what was happening to Jaguar or Cosworth, and we felt we were facing a genuine crisis."
At this point, I interrupt (again) to ask why it is that the Minardi boss is now looked upon as the spokesman, the shop steward, of the pitlane. He begins by telling me that he hates that particular title.
"There are probably two reasons why I got the job," he explains. "Firstly, because I'm the only sad bastard who goes everywhere with a copy of the Concorde Agreement, and secondly, because I do, contrary to what anyone else might think, want to keep the sport I love going forward in a professional way. When I've had to thump the table, I've done it. I won't back down. I think it's fair to say I had been Max's strongest supporter among the Team Principals, and also someone who had been highly complimentary to Ferrari, but these problems are not going to go away.
"Since the end of last season, I've had two days off, and other than Minardi and F1, I do have other business interests. I'm happy to do it, to work day and night, if in the end we get a Formula One that means something, and we start to take the governance of the sport seriously, which is what we haven't always done in the past.
"What has emerged is a genuine will to cut 30 per cent from the top teams' budgets, a determination to make the racing more exciting - and if you reduce testing to 10 days, with a single tyre, you're going to have some bloody good races - but sadly, Ferrari doesn't want to know."
"Why?" I ask.
"Because they want to win everything," he replies, without hesitation. "They want to win everything between now and the end of 2006. You can't blame them for that, but . . . ."
"Which leads to Ron's claim that Ferrari's victories in 2005, if they don't abide by the test limits, will be hollow," I comment.
"Ferrari is the oldest and most prestigious team in Formula One competition," He responds. "With that kind of fantastic heritage, though, comes a 'duty of care' to leave the sport in at least as good a condition as it was when you came into it. It's about building things up, not tearing them down.
"Another example is the proposal for the 2.4-litre V8 engine. There is massive upset against it. The 3-litre V10 is protected under Concorde until December 31, 2007, and there is no way that Max can do anything about it. That said, we could still end up with the V8, because some manufacturers have gone too far down that route to change, but it's not legal. The 2.4-litre V8 cannot be introduced without unanimous agreement.
"Going back to Max Mosley's Monaco press conference, he said: 'For what it's worth, the two things that are completely fundamental are, (a) a single tyre, and (b) the standard ECU, or at least electronics completely under the control of the FIA.'
"He then went on to say that, 'the FIA cannot change the engine capacity on grounds of safety, or indeed, at all, without the unanimous agreement of the teams, before January 1, 2008'.
"These are direct quotes," emphasises Stoddart. "Max has done what I believe Americans would call a 'flip-flop'."
Again, he quotes Mosley's comments in Monaco: "We can't change the size of the engines for safety under the Concorde Agreement, because the Concorde Agreement allows us to do something dramatic for safety only in those areas that concern the protection of the driver, or what you might call passive safety.
"The only people who can define passive safety," Stoddart continues, "are the Technical Working Group, which has exclusive jurisdiction."
There's much rustling of papers as the Minardi boss seeks out a Ross Brawn comment made back in May. Finally, the rustling stops. "Another notable comment during a healthy debate on engines was that of Ross Brawn, who stated that Ferrari would be happy to introduce their 2.4-litre V8 engine in 2006, as they felt they could not maintain their current engine performance until 2008. Interesting, eh?" says the Australian.
"Following Brazil, Bernie approached Michelin and I went to Hiroshi Yasukawa (Bridgestone, Director of Motorsport) and said, 'I'm sorry, but at the end of the day, we have to do this. It's the only thing that will be good for F1.' He said, 'Yes, I agree, single tyre is the way to go.' I don't know what Pierre Dupasquier (Michelin, Director of Worldwide Racing) said to Bernie, but I don't think it was negative.
"I think that although neither company wants to leave the sport, both realise that eventually we're going to go for a single tyre," he continues, "because under 7.5 (c) (II), it is the least prejudicial to the competitors.
"Another thing that people ought to think about is, who says the cars are too fast? Although the Technical Working Group talks about having to do something in the future about the speed of the cars, they've never taken a vote to formalise this view, which if they had, would have meant it was passed firstly to the Team Principals, and ultimately, to the F1 Commission, to be voted upon.
"Max claims that the Technical Working Group consistently said the cars were too fast and that we had to reduce the engine capacity. That is absolutely true in terms of the general discussion that took place, but the TWG never took a vote on it."
I ask how he would define whether F1 cars are too fast or not.
"I would say that the cars are becoming too fast when we get to a point where we have a spate of accidents, and we see evidence that the cars are not withstanding the accidents in the way they had been previously.
"I'm sure that the 300 million people watching at home on a Sunday afternoon don't want to see ultra-safe cars running around, never doing anything wrong. Whether we like it or not, motor racing in general, and F1 in particular, is a gladiatorial sport. If we eliminate all accidents and all risk, then it'll be even more boring than it is at present.
"When we begin to see a trend developing involving serious accidents where there is a threat to the driver, other competitors, spectators or marshals, then we must slow the cars. Thankfully, we haven't seen anything like that, in terms of drivers, since 1994, and we haven't seen it in terms of marshals, since Melbourne and then Monza.
"After Melbourne and Monza, there was a lot of work done, to provide further protection for the marshals and spectators, in terms of debris fencing and the positioning of marshals, and yet it was nothing to do with the cars that caused those two accidents (both fatalities). They were both accidents where parts of the car became detached and flew off - specifically, wheels. The point is, they would have come off whether the cars were 2 secs slower or 10 secs quicker. What we did was to address why they became detached from the cars, and we've continually upgraded the specification of the wheel tethers, making them even stronger.
"You can never dismiss safety, however, and where Max claims the moral high ground is when he says, 'Guys, do you want to be responsible for saying that the cars are safe, then someone gets killed, you get sued and an arrest warrant is issued?' They're fear tactics, and he does the same with the manufacturers. The problem is, his contention is not sustainable. Look at rallying. How dangerous is that, with cars zooming within inches of spectators? While we must never be complacent about safety, F1 is thankfully very survivable these days.
"As we all know, motor sport is dangerous; however, it is my firm belief that there is no underlying trend that warrants these so-called measures. If anyone believes that these measure are intended to enhance safety, think again.
"Having previously had seven sets of tyres available, and witnessed (Ralf) Schumacher's accident at Indianapolis, where it is claimed the car went over debris, and Alonso's monumental shunt, when he ran over debris, I would love someone to explain to me how, on safety grounds, we can say, 'Boys, you've got to go out and do two qualifying sessions and the entire race on one set of tyres. If you don't like that, you can come in and change tyres, but you'll be penalised, and effectively your race will be ******!'
I'm about to interrupt again, but Stoddart is in full flow . . . .
"One of the most exciting parts of a boring Formula One race these days, once Michael has lapped the entire field, is the pit stops," he says. "They do look good, both for the sponsors and the fans, and they're action-packed, but now they've effectively killed them, with one mechanic on each wheel. We're dumbing down F1 to an unacceptable level. If we're not careful, the GP2 cars will be faster and even sound better."
He's fearful for 2005, and believes that the new rules will make a mockery of the sport, with some drivers electing to 'retire' in an attempt to save their engines, while also fearing that Schumacher and Ferrari could dominate in a fashion superior to 2002 and 2004.
He also accepts that much of the blame lies with the teams: "We had the opportunity last year to unite as we have now, and you have to say, if we had done it then, we wouldn't be sitting here now with all these problems. We have to put our hands up and admit that we screwed up 100 per cent.
"Right now, what can fix this problem is a correctly convened Formula One Commission meeting, the only body within F1 with the power to make regulations, sporting and technical, other than these so-called dubious safety measures that Max has invoked. The F1 Commission has not had a meeting since these measures were invoked. We begged for that meeting on December 9, which would have sorted all this out, but Max unilaterally cancelled it.
"Want to know why he cancelled it?" he asks.
I'm sure that even if I say no, he's determined to tell me, but as it happens, I do want to know.
"Morally, if not legally, we needed to give the tyre companies notice of intent to switch to a single tyre for January 1, 2006, by December 31, 2004. Some people feel Max cancelled the December meeting because Ferrari does not want a single tyre in 2006. It wants to get to the end of its stated period of domination, the end of 2006. It wants to win everything and can't do it so easily with a single tyre rule in place. I will leave it to people to draw their own conclusions.
We could have had a properly constructed, legal notice period, Formula One Commission meeting on December 9, in Monaco, where many of us were present, and Max cancelled it. He claimed that in the close proximity to Christmas, we wouldn't get a quorum, yet if he had asked, he would have known there were enough of us present to form a quorum, as we were there for the FIA Awards that night. It's amazing that he had enough for a quorum on December 10 for the World Motorsport Council meeting, but claimed there weren't enough the day before."
"So where are we right now", I ask? "What is the next step?"
"The next step is that we go to Melbourne and contest the first three races," he replies. "We - the nine teams - will then take our technical directors and our engine partners, lock ourselves away for two days, and thrash out our own proposals. We will discuss every aspect of the regulations for 2008, and look at what genuinely can be done to save money in 2006 and 2007.
"Ferrari is invited, although whether they will attend remains to be seen, and after a couple of days, we'll emerge with our proposals, which in due course, will be given to Max. These will be carefully thought-out proposals, not knee-jerk reactions, not favouring one team over another, but what all of those involved believe will be the best solution for F1.
"We have to come up with this, because we have a moral duty," he admits, "not just to our partners and our sponsors, but to the public, because if we fail, one day before too long they're going to walk away.
"So where is this going to end?" says Paul. "We're at a stage where Max and Ferrari turn up for a meeting that the rest of the teams all said was too important to be held at 14:30 on a Friday afternoon. Consequently, Max issues a statement saying that the teams can't be interested in costs because they wouldn't attend the meeting.
"The fact is, half of the points raised in that meeting are things we want to discuss, but the other half are irrelevant, because they're not true cost savings.
"What we also see is an about-turn from Ferrari, which says that it's now in favour of a single tyre. In my view, it's a cynical position, because as a result of cancelling that 9 December meeting, they know the single tyre can't now happen in 2005, and arguably it can't happen in 2006, although that's not written in stone. By cancelling that December meeting, it got Ferrari through that magic deadline of 31 December, by which time we had to notify the tyre companies. Max knew that we had 21 out of a possible 26 votes in favour of a single tyre. We had the mandate, and it was going to go through.
"It's fine for Ross (Brawn) to say at the Friday (January 28, 2005) meeting with Max that he is now in favour of a single tyre. He knows full well the deadline has passed, and he's fully aware the earliest we can now morally bring in the single tyre is January 1, 2007.
"Understand this," says Stoddart, "and this is from the minutes that pitpass.com has published: on 28 January, Ross Brawn and Jean Todt said that Ferrari is in favour of a single tyre. At a meeting of the Technical Working Group, on 8 December, in Monaco, however, the day before a meeting of the Formula One Commission in Monaco, which Max cancelled, and two days before a meeting of the World Motor Sport Council, in Monaco, Ross Brawn said Ferrari is, 'absolutely opposed to a single tyre supplier' (item 13.4, note on costs from Mr Brawn, page 8 of 13, Technical Working Group minutes, 8 December 2004)."
Again, I have to clarify: "So on December 8, Brawn says that Ferrari is totally opposed to a single tyre, but a month later (January 28), they're in favour?"
"Correct," says Stoddart. "And why? Because they've got through the December 31, 2006 deadline, at which time all the contracts come to an end - Michael's, Jean's and Ross's.
"Max has made many of the documents public, but as you yourself have admitted, most people aren't going to wade through 45 pages.
"We've discussed all the problems, but there also have to be solutions," says, taking a deep breath. "There's no point continually discussing problems, as that won't get us anywhere. The solutions are as follows:
"Even with all that's transpired, we want Ferrari and Max back on board with us.
"We want to produce a set of regulations by the middle of this year - regulations that mean something, that are properly thought through, that will generate significant cost savings, but more to the point, will lower the cost of what it takes to be competitive in F1. You cannot stop manufacturers spending what they've got, but you can reduce the amount it takes to be competitive. There will be a second supply of engines, and there will be something in it for the sponsors, for the technical partners and for the public. We want to put on a show.
"Formula One didn't get into its current state overnight, and we can't resolve the situation overnight with ill thought-out reactions. That's the fatal mistake we made in the past. Every change costs money, and when you make changes that are not thought through clearly, which is exactly what Max has done, you end up with the mess you have now."
"Ron Dennis has said that if Ferrari doesn't go along with the majority, particularly with regard to testing restrictions, it will render any victory ' hollow'. Do you agree?" I ask?
"I agree," says Stoddart.
"But at the end of the day, will most people out there really give a damn that it's hollow?" I ask. "After all, a win is a win."
"That's where you guys come in," he replies, referring to the media. "If Ferrari chooses to play to a different set of rules and starts lapping the rest of the pack, which I think they will, it's up to you to make it clear what's happening. The media isn't stupid, and neither are the fans.
"Let me stress that this is not about being anti-Ferrari; it's about the long-term future of the sport. If we want to make the regulations legal for 2005, we need a Formula One Commission meeting to do it. That is the only way. That said, because we are effectively into the new season, the only way to legitimise the regulations is to have unanimity, with the 10 teams, Bernie and Max all in agreement.
"If we don't, we'll just race on, and I'm certainly not going to protest anyone. I do think we ought to learn a very valuable lesson from this, however, which is what I believe the teams have done: they will not be rushed into another set of regulation changes, which is what would have happened if we'd attended the January 28, 2005 meeting with Max. He would have had a prepared press statement ready that said, 'the teams have agreed to this, this and this . . . .'
"His most famous one is the single ECU. He doesn't have a mandate to bring in a single ECU, but he could eliminate everyone for cheating by not doing it. The next thing you'll see is Max invoking Article 59, which effectively says that the driver shall drive the car unaided. Now you have an issue there where you could disqualify the entire field, and he's aware of that."
"But this would make the sport even more of a laughing stock than it already is," I comment.
"Precisely," says Stoddart. "And that is why I'm begging Max to join us. We need to make peace and go forward in a united way. It's never too late, although it's certainly not looking too good at the moment."
"But the good thing is, that you nine are totally united?" I ask.
"Absolutely," he replies.
"So no-one is going to break ranks re testing as the season progresses?"
"No way," he replies. "Do you know how united we are? I received a letter from BAR apologising for an innocent mistake, whereby on Friday, they had three cars on track at the same time. 'We suddenly realised (the situation),' they wrote. 'We stopped it, and it won't happen again.' You tell me if that isn't unity.
"Ferrari really are racing themselves and to their own set of rules," he says.
"So it is a championship within a championship," I ask.
"Once upon a time, in Formula One, you used to say that second was the first loser. Under the current regulations, in 2005, there will be a new reality, in my view, with second being the true winner."
It's not my job, dear reader, to try and tell you who is right and who is wrong. It is however my duty to give you as much information as I can in order that you can form your own opinion.
The FIA has made public a number of documents that appear to tell the story. However, Paul Stoddart is adamant that there is much information that we are not being given access to.
Remember, this isn't Paul Stoddart, Minardi boss, holding out the begging bowl, and whining about the cost of running his team, this is Paul Stoddart, representing nine of the ten Formula One teams that will contest the 2005 World Championship season.
As I said at the beginning, there are two sides to every story, hopefully, the case for the nine 'rebel' teams is now a little more clear.
Chris Balfe
Editor
To check out previous features from Chris, click here